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IN THE SUPREME COUR'T 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
W. B. RUS·SELL, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
NEIL R. OLMS·TEAD 
C. C. PATTERSON 
Attorneys for Appellant 
STATEMENT OF F·AC·T·s 
The plaintiff commenced his employment with the 
defendant on or about the 28th day of August, 1941. 
For almost four years he worked for defendant without 
ever having any disciplinary action against him. He 
had never been called for an investigation nor had any 
disciplinary action against him. He had never been called 
for an investigation nor had any demerits ever been 
assessed against him (Tr. 113, 170). His employment 
was covered by a Collective Bar~aining Agreement. 
Rules 55 (a), 55 (b) and 38 thereof p·rovide as follows : 
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"55. Leave of Absence: (a) Yardmen will 
not be granted leave of .absence for a longer period 
than 90 days except in case of sickness, committee 
work, or by permission of the Superintendent. 
"(b) Yardmen taking leave of absence for a 
period of over ten days must secure and fill out 
Form 153 so the leave will be covered as a m·atter 
of record. 
"38. Investigations: No yardman will be sus-
pended or dismis_sed without first having fair and 
impartial hearing and his guilt established. The 
man whose case is under consideration may be 
repres.ented by an employe of his choice, who may 
be a committeeman, who will be permitted to inter-
rogate witnesses. The accused and his representa-
tive shall be permitted to hear the testimony of 
"t " w1 nesses ... 
On or about the 4th day of July 1945 the plaintiff 
was scalded while working for the defendant and \Yas off 
work at least eleven days by virtue of such scalding 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit "A" and Tr. 86). "\Vnen he returned 
to work, having been gone for a period of time in excess 
of ten days, no one called him for an investigation nor 
suggested that he could not return to work because he 
had not obtained a leave of absence. At that time he did 
not obtain such a leave nor ask for one, believing the 
fact that as he· had visited the doctor and "~as technically 
under his care, he was exonorated fron1 any application 
of the rule ( Tr. 234 and 235). 
After the sealding plaintiff returned to work and 
worked for a matter of several days (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"A"), and on or about July 20 or 21st h;e laid off sick 
because of a cold. He only intended to be gone a day 
or two and did not intend to be gone in excess of ten 
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days (Tr. 85, 86 and 216). After he had be·en off work 
for approximately six d.ays he becam·e sufficiently ill that 
his wife drove him to the doctor (Tr. 216 and 217). His 
condition was diagnosed as a mid-ear infection which 
frequently took a long series of treatment (Tr. 225). He 
received two prescriptions from the doctor on July 27, 
an atomizer for his sore throat and medication for his 
ear. 
After treatment from the doctor he went home and 
remained home in bed until he w.as called on August 1st 
at 6 :30 o'clock in the morning to report for a formal 
investigation at 2 P.M. of that date for reason of his 
alleged violation of the Collective Bargaining Agree-
ment, by reason of his being abs:ent without leave for a 
period in excess of ten days. 
It is conceded by the defendant in its Answers to 
Interrogatories, Answers to Requests for Admissions, 
and the testimony of John E. 0. Burton (Tr. 38-43) that 
no witnesses testified at said hearing except Russell; 
that Russell heard no testimony against himself; that 
he was not permitted to interrogate witnesses because 
no witnesses were produced; and that he was given no 
opportunity for re.buttal, there being no testimony ad-
verse to him introduced which would require rebuttal; 
and that the transcript of the said investigation is a 
full and complete record of the alleged hearing. 
On the 4th day of August, 1945, the defendant dis-
missed the plaintiff from it's service, assigning as its 
reason therefor that plaintiff had been absent from his 
employment for a period of over ten days in violation 
of Rule 55 (b). 
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On January 14, 1946, and within .a period of six 
months from the date of discharge, plaintiff filed with 
defendant written obj-ections to his dismissal, and re-
quested reinstatement (Exhibit "B"). On January 22, 
1946 defendant, through it's Superintendent, reaffirmed 
the dismissal (Exhibit "C"). 
This case was tried previously and appe.aled to this 
court in Russell vs. O.U.R. ~ D. (Utah) 247 P. (2) 257. 
At that time the defendant ba.sed its appeal primarily 
upon the fact that it contended it had proof and could 
prove, but was denied the opportunity by the lower court, 
that the plaintiff had been guilty of a misrep-resentation 
at the time of the hearing when he said he was ill, and 
that it could prove and had proof that the plaintiff was 
not ill but in fact the plaintiff worked each and every 
day during the period of his absence at the Pine View Inn 
selling beer, and that fact was also conceded by his 
Union representative, Mr. C. E. McDaniels, Vice Presi-
dent of the Switchmen's Union of North America. This 
court believed those representations and !1:r. Justice 
McDonough held that it would be a travesty of justice 
to permit the p~laintiff to recover on the basis of the 
hearing alone, when the defendant could prove the falsity 
of his statements. This view was concurred in by Justice 
Crockett who found that the plaintiff's own representa-
tive finally conceded that plaintiff "~as justifiably dis-
charged. These findings were conclusions and not based 
upon fact. The facts were that Mr. !fcD.aniels \Yithdrew 
from the case solely upon instructions from nlr. Cashin, 
International President of the s,vitclunen's Union of 
North America (Tr. 192, 193 and 197) for the sole 
re·ason that the plaintiff was not a dues p:aying member 
of the Switchmen's Union of North A1nerica. He stated 
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further that he had personally made an investigation as 
to whether the plaintiff had testified falsely at said 
hearing and had come to the conclusion as a result of 
his personal inquiry that he could find no false testimony 
(Tr. 187), and that the facts contained in Mr. Hudgens' 
letter to Mr. Edens were in fact correct. 
Mr. McDaniels testified further that he did not con-
cede at any time that his withdrawal from the case was 
not done with plaintiff's consent (Tr. 201), rand that his 
letter to Paulson meant and should have been interpreted 
to mean that his withdr,aw.al from the case was without 
any prejudice to the plaintiff's right to proceed further 
('Tr. 210, 212, 213), and that he so advis-ed Mr. Russell 
to that effect (Tr. 214). 
On the other hand, Mr. Edens, Superintendent of 
the defendant, conceded th~at he had never had any per-
sonal knowledge that plaintiff was not in fact sick and 
that he did not know of a single solitary soul who knew 
whether Russell was sick or not (Tr. 117). In answer to 
interrogatories and admissions the defendant conceded 
that no inquiry was ever made by 'anyone as to whether 
the plaintiff had been ill or testified fals-ely in the investi-
gation until April of 1946, eight months after the plain-
tiff was discharged. 
1\Ir. Paulson, Vice President of the defendant, 
admitted all of these facts ~nd te.stified in addition 
thereto that pl'aintiff was not discharged solely because 
he had been absent for ten days but that part of the 
reason for the discharge was outside employment (Tr. 
174), a subject not a part of the formal investigation 
and not a ground for discharge under the contract. 
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THE NATURE OF THE CASE ON APPEAL 
T·he questions raised by this appeal are : 
(1) Doe.s Rule 55(b) constitute a proper ground 
for disch~arge ~ 
(2) Did the defendant accord to the p,laintiff his 
rights under Rule 38 ~ 
(3) Is defendant bound.by its testimony and oral 
argument that plaintiff was discharged at least in part 
for reasons other than Rule 55 (b) ~ 
( 4) Did the court err in its instructions and its 
refusal to give the plaintiff's requested instructions~ 
POINT I 
RULE 55(b) D·OES NO·T CONSTITUTE A GRO·UND FOR 
DISCHARGE. 
The defendant charged the plaintiff with a violation 
of Rule 55 (b) and discharged him for an asserted viola-
tion thereof: 
"55. (b) Yardmen taking leave of absence 
for a p.eriod of over ten days must s-ecure .and fill 
out Form 153 so the leave will be covered M a 
matter of record." 
It is necessary for a proper consideration of this 
problem to consider also Rule 55 (a) : 
"55. (a) Yardmen "\Yill not be granted leave 
of abs.ence for a longer period than 90 days except 
in case of sickness, con1mittee "\York, or by per-
mission of the Superintendent." 
It will be seen that no leaves "\vill be granted in excess 
of 90 days unless they .are approved by the Superin-
tendant, except in case of sickness or ·COn1n1ittee work. 
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Now here is it indicated that permission is required for 
illness or committee work. Nowhere is it suggested that 
a man cannot be away for more than 90 days as a matter 
of right. 
If that be true, and the language can't be denied, 
does it follow that if a man is away for a lesser period, 
that he must have the apr-roval of anyone, particularly 
where, a.s here, the rule s.tates that the only purpose 
is so that the leave can be covered as a matter of record. 
Clearly the first requirement of the rule is that an 
employee intends to be away for more than 10 days. This 
is conceded by the defendant. Its Mr. Beckett, a signa-
tory to the contract, testified (Tr. 128) : 
"A. Well, that rule itself tells you what you will 
do to secure a leave of absence. 
Q. That means if you anticipate being off for 
a period of time in excess of ten days, doesn't 
"t~ 1 . 
A. That's right." 
Again discussing illness (Tr. 128-129): 
"Q. Suppose you didn't .anticipate being off for 
a period of ten days but just for example on 
the lOth day you were in an automobile acci-
dent and ended up in the hospital, did the 
union contend that he had violated the rule 
because he hadn't gotten the written leave 
before he went to the hospital~ 
A. Well, in cases of that nature the local chair-
man would be aware of those things and if a 
man was injured or in the hospital the loeal 
chairman made application for leave of ab-
sence. That covered the man." 
And again (Tr. 131-132): 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
"Q. When he was sick in bed~ 
A. Well, if he was sick in bed we usually provided 
for that. 
Q. What do you mean you usually provided for 
that~ 
A. Well, if we found that ·a man was sick in bed 
or was injured and so forth, that he was more 
or less gr.anted a leave of ·absence when it was 
a bona fide fact that such wa.s the case." 
This is the only testimony on this phase elicited 
from any of the defendant's witnesses. The defendant 
is bound by it. On the other hand, the uncontradicted 
testimony is that the plaintiff did not anticipate being 
away for over 10 days. In fact he expected and planned 
to be absent for only a couple of days (Tr. 222-22.3). 
Nowhere did the defendant attempt to contradict or deny 
this fact. 
Further, it was conceded that thi.s \Vas not a disci-
plinary rule. Mr. Beckett, the defendant's ''~tness, testi-
fied that he did not know of any rule of the defendant 
th.at provided for a penalty for the violation of Rule 
55 (b). 
This conduct on the part of the defendant and its 
agents, and its recognition that it is the only reasonable 
and p·roper interpretation finds ruuple support in law. 
It has long been recognized that the Inere failure to 
obey orders not involving wilful insubordination is not 
enough to justify discharge. Thus in 1886 the Supreme 
Court of Michigan recognized the rule, Shaver vs. Inger-
ham, 26 N.\V. 162. The· plaintiff liad been hired for one 
year. l-Ie absented hin1self from work for one day con-
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trary to the express desires of the defendant who dis-
charged him. The court, in affirming judgm.ent for the 
plaintiff, reviewed the law and concluded: 
"In Filleiul v. Armstrong, 7 Ado I. & E. 557, 
the failure of a teacher to return within a day 
or two .after vaeation, although it wa.s strongly 
urged that the course of the school was seriously 
interfered with, was held not .sufficient when s~e.t 
up in a plea to answer the case made by the 
declaration, and no ground to justify the dis-
charge. The language of the court is clear on 
the insufficiency of the showing, and it was sug-
gested that, even if ,actual loss was shown, it 
would be the ground of claim for reduction of 
wages, and not of discharge, where there was no 
serious moral wrong. In Callo v. Broun·cker, 4 
Car. & P. 518, the jury were told that there must 
be mo:ral misconduct, pecuniary or otherwise, will-
ful disobedience, or habitual neglect, to justify 
dismissal from service for a year; and, although 
both disobedience and neglect of orders were 
shown in several instances, the court would not 
let the jury act upon them 'as a serious enough to 
be sufficient. In that ~case the ser·vant was a 
traveling courier. In Edwards v. Levy, 2 Fost. & 
F. 94, where there was a single act of neglect 
accompanied by insolence, the court held the plain-
tiff's case should go to the jury, as this. could n·ot 
be held, as matter of law, ground for discharge. 
The cases of Cussons v. Skinner, 11 Mee·s. & W. 
161, and Smith v~ Allen, 3 Fost. & F. 157, in addi-
tion to requiring disobedience to he willful, call 
attention to another elem'ent of decision, which is 
especially applicable here. It is held, not only 
that a .sufficient cause must be shown, but also 
that the wrong was actually the real cause of 
dismis~sal, and not merely an ostensible re1ason. 
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"Willful disobedience, in the sense in which 
the word is used by the authorities, means some-
thing more than a conscious failure to obey. It 
involves a wrongful or perverse disposition, such 
as to render the conduct unreasonable, and in-
consistent with prop,er subordination. We are not 
prepared to hold that, even in what is known 
as menial service, every act of disobedience may 
be lawfully punished by the penalty of dismissal 
and the serious consequences which it entails 
upon the .servant put out of place. No doubt 
domestic employment may be closer than that in 
business employment; but there must be a limit 
to the arbitrary power of masters. In such em-
ployments as involve a higher order of services, 
and some degree of discretion and judgment, it 
would, in our opinion, be unauthorized and un~ 
reasonable to regard skilled mechanics, or other 
employes, as subject to the whim and caprice 
of their employers, or as deprived of all right 
of action to .such a degree as to be liable to lose 
their places upon every omission to obey orders, 
involving no serious consequences.'' 
In 1899 the Supreme Court of Indiana in Hamilton 
v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N.E. 181, reached the same 
conclusion independently, and affirmed a judgment for 
the plaintiff, stating: 
"The master "Tould have no right to dis-
charge the servant for trivial or unimportant 
acts of disobedience or negligence." 
It must be concluded therefor that a mere breach 
of ,a rule or neglec.t to adhere to it, if done inadvertently, 
is not sufficien~t to ju,stify a discharge. l\Iore is required. 
The additional elen1ents are intent and "\Yilfullness. 
In the ease of Ehlers v. Langley, (Calif.) 237 Pac. 
10 
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55, the court held : 
"Although it is not necessary that the viola-
tion be perverse or malicious, or that it be the 
result of an evil intent toward the master, it must 
be made cle·ar that the thing done or omitted to be 
done was done or omitted intentionally, the rule 
being grounded on the theory that willful disobedi-
ence of specific instructions of the master, if such 
instructions be reasonable and consistent with the 
contract of employment, is a breach of duty-
a bre·ach of the. cont:vact of service; and like 
any other breach of contract, of itself entitles 
the master to renounce the contract of employ-
ment." 
In Goudal v. DeMille Pictures Corp., (C.alif.) 5 
Pac. (2) 433, it was held: 
"To constitute a refusal or failure to perform 
the conditions of a contract of employment such 
as we have here, there must be, on the p~art of 
the actress, a willful act or willful misconduct. 
(May v. New York Motion Picture Corp. 45 
Cal. App. 396, 187 P. 785; Ehlers v. Langley & 
Michaels Co. 72 Cal. App. 21.4, 237 P. 55)." 
So even though it be s.aid that the failure of an 
incapacitated employee to secure and fill out Form 153 
covering his absence constitutes a technical violation 
of the rule, still such violation, being neither willful 
nor intentional, eannot be used by the employer as a 
ground for discharge. 
And in Bang v. International Sisal Co., Minn. 4 N.W. 
(2) 113, the court held: 
"The privilege of discharge has been said to 
exist in those cases where there has been a 
material breach of the employment contract, and 
11 
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"wilful disobedience" is recognized as such a 
breach." 
The above cases set forth .a role that has been recog-
nized as a role in the federal court since 1913. In Carp-
enter Steel Co. v. Norcross, 6th Cir. 204 F. 537 the 
court had the p.roblem of a wrongful discharge and for 
the fir~st time discussed what type of misconduct would 
in fact justify a discharge. In so considering the problem, 
the court laid down the following rule: 
"And preliminary thereto a wol'ld or two 
should be said as to the nature of the misconduct 
which the l~aw makes a justification for a dis-
charge. It is certain that conduct involving moral 
turp~itude, willful insubordination, or habitual 
neglect is such misconduct as to justify a dis-
charge. An early case limited justification thereto. 
But it is now 'vell settled that any conduct which 
is predudicia:l or likely to be prejudicial or injures 
or has a tendency to injure the master is mis-
conduCJt that w.arrants a discharge, 20 A. & E. 
Enc. of Law, p. 27; 26 Cyc. pp. 988, 990. 
"In Wood, ~faster and Servant, p. 208, the 
law is st~ated thus: '~Iisconduct prejudicial to the 
master's interests, although not exhibiting moral 
turpitude, is good cause for the discharge of a 
servant. And conduct exhibiting moral turpitude, 
although productive of no damage to the n1aster's 
interests, is a good ground for ten1rinating the 
contract. Mere misconduct, not an1ounting to in-
subordination, or exerting a bad influence over 
other servants, or producing injury to the 1naster's 
business, or 1nembers of the 1na.ster's fa1nily, is 
not enough to "\Yarrant the discharge of a ser-
vant. The mi.sconduct 1nust be gross or such .as 
1s incompatible with the relation, or pernicious 
12 
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in its influence, or injurious to the master's busi-
ness.' 
"And again on page 220 the matter is put 
thus : 'In order to justify a master in discharging 
a servant the servant must have been guilty of 
conduct that amounts to a breach of some ex-
pre.ss or implied provision of the contract of 
hiring. Anything less than that will not amount 
to a legal justification or excuse. The mere fact 
that he has been guilty of improper or unbe-
coming conduct, . or that he has, in some slight 
matters, been guilty of a violation of his master's 
orders, will not warrant his discharge; but his 
conduCit must have been such .as to involve moral 
turpitude and hi.s insubordination must have been 
willful and such as is inconsistent with the rela-
tion which he holds to the mas.ter and the duties 
he owes him.' " 
See .also K eserich v. Carnegie Ill. Steel Corp., 7th 
Cir. 163 F. (2) 889; Seagram & Sons v. Bynum, 8th 
Cir. 191 F. (2) 5, Sawyer v. E. F. Drew & Co., 111 Fed. 
Supp. 1; Thomas v. N.Y., C. & St. L. R. Co., 97 F. Sup·p. 
687; Crisler v. Ill. Central R. Co., 5th Cir. 196 F. (2) 941. 
In addition, to justify the discharge, it must be 
shown that the plaintiff knew th.at his failure to fill 
out and secure Form 153 might be used by his employer 
as a ground for discharge. True it is in this case the 
defendant proved that it had in the past used a viola-
tion of Rule 55 (b) as a reason for discharge, but it 
did not prove nor offer to prove that it had ever dis-
charged an ·employee for viol,ating the rule where the 
absence resulted from illnes.s or accident. On the con-
trary, the defendant's witnesses conceded thaJt such per-
sons were protected. 
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W ~ submit the following cases as additional au-
thority for the proposition that the defendant could not 
properly disch,arge this employee for a violation of the 
rule resulting from illne.ss without a showing that it 
had in th·e past invoked the s.ame penalty against other 
employees for similar violations: National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Kohen-Ligon-Folz, 128 F. (2) 502; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Weyerhaeuser Timber 
Co., 132 F. (2) 234; National Labor Relations Board v. 
Viking Pump Co., 113 F. (2) 759; National Labor Re-
lations Board v. Empire Worsted JYiills, 129 F. (2) 688; 
National Labor Relations Board v. Oregon Worsted 
Co. 96 F. (2) 193. 
Finally, as the rule itself states, the filling out of 
the form is solely to make the absence a matter of 
record. Unless, therefore, defendant has shown (and it 
h·as not) that in failing to have a form covering this 
particular absence as a matter of record it has been 
adversely affected, the purely technical violation of the 
rule could not be relied upon as a basis for discharge. 
Moreover, that the filling out of the form i.s merely for 
the record shows that the requirement of the rule relates 
only to intentional, voluntary absences. Imagine an em-
ployee being required to fill out a form stating in sub-
stance, "I hereby app.Iy for a leave of absence for the 
purpose of being sick for a period in excess of ten days." 
It is submitted that Rule 55 (b) was not available 
as a ba.sis for an investigation or as a reason for dis-
charge for the following reasons, any one of which 
standing alone obviates the acts of the defendant: 
(1) The defendant never has pleaded, claimed or 
offered to prove that the plaintiff intended, when he 
14 
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laid off, to be gone in excess of 10 days. 
(2) The defendant never pleaded, claimed or of-
fered to prove that the absence was willful or intentional. 
(3) The defendant never pleaded, claimed or of-
fered to prove that the plaintiff knew that the rule 
applied to illness or sickness. 
( 4) The defendant never ple~aded, claimed or of-
fered to prove that the violation of the rule materially 
damaged the defendant. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANT DID NOT ACCORD TO' THE PLAIN-
TIFF HI1S RIGHTS UNDER RULE 38. 
It has been conceded that plaintiff's employment 
was governed by a contr.act made and entered into by 
the defendant and the Brotherhood of Railway Train-
men. The contract \Vas authorized by the Railway Labor 
Act. As such it has been ruled that substantive questions 
of law are to he governed by the federal interpretations. 
Thus concepts of negligence are governed by federal 
decisions and do not vary with the varying concepts 
of negligence applicable under state and local laws, 
and federal decisional law formulating and applying to 
concept govern.s, U rie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 93 L. 
Ed. 1282. The law, as established by decisions, is binding 
upon state courts, Jester v. Southern Railway Co. (S.C.) 
29 S.E. (2) 768. This view is substantiated ~and followed 
on contract cases, Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 
v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 97 L. Ed. 1325. 
The federal rule is laid down in Transcontinental & 
Western Air, Inc., v. Koppal, 199 F. (2) 117, which was 
not available to this court at the time of its first decision 
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in this case. In the Koppal case, the plaintiff was em-
ployed under a contract between the _defendant and the 
International Association of Machinists. The provisions 
for a hearing are substantially identical to the case at 
bar. The contract was likewise one under the Railway 
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 181 et seq. The 8th Circuit had 
to define fair hearing and held : 
"In so far as the term 'fair hearing' in its 
use in this provision could be said to imply that 
a discharge should de·pend, not simply upon 
whether cause might ·exist in fact, but rather 
upon whethe:r p-roof of the existence of such 
cause was sufficiently made against the employee 
at a hearing as to be capable of inducing and to 
have constituted the basis of the employer's ac-
tion, what we have said above is here equally 
controlling of plaintiff's lack of right on the evi-
dence to have these questions tested by a jury 
as a matter of 'fair hearing.' No more on this 
particular aspect than on the general question 
considered above, does the evidence afford any 
basis for a jury to say that sufficient cause 
legally for discharge was not proved or that the 
employer's action was not taken on the basis of 
this .p:roof. It should be added also th·at the ques-
tion of bias or prejudice in the hearing officer 
as an element of 'fair hearing' is not here in-
volved. 
"If therefore any jury question existed in 
the situation in relation to the contractual pro-
vision for 'fair hearing,' it would only be because 
of the impossibility of saying as a matter of law 
that all of the processes which the agreement 
required to underlie the hearing, and which ac-
cordingly constituted in·cidents thereof, had been 
p,rope-rly complied with, .and so a legal doubt 
16 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
could exist as to the significance of such omis-
sion or deviation as had occurred, which the 
employee wa.s entitled to have appraised in rela-
tion to whether on all the circumstances there 
had been a breach of the prescription for 'fair 
hearing' with its intended incidents., and whether 
the employee had been prejudiced thereby." 
See also Atlantic Coast Line v. Brotherhood, 210 
F. (2') 812; New Or.leans Public Belt R. v. Ward, 195 
F. (2) 829; Buster v. M. & St. P. & P. Ry. Co., 195 F 
(2) 73. 
This court has recognized that the contract must 
be adhered to as a condition precedent to discharge. 
Russell v. Ogden Union Ry. & Depot Co., supra. At page 
261 it stated: 
"It is true that in a proper case the tra;nseript 
of the he~aring might itself reveal unjust dis-
charge. Thus, if it showed conclusively that the 
plaintiff was not accorded his rights under the 
contract: that he was not given adequate notice, 
or was not given opportunity to be heard or to 
be repre.sented by an employee of his choice, 
the discharge would be wrongful, because ac-
cording the employee such rights is, under the 
contract, a condition precedent to discipline or 
discharge." 
The contract, and in particular Rule 38, provides in 
part as follows : 
"38. I nvesti,qations: No yardman will be 
suspended or dismissed without first having a 
fair and impartial hearing and his guilt estab-
lished. The man whose case is under considera-
tion may be represented by an emp~oyee of his 
choice, who may be a committeeman, who will 
be permitted to interrogate witnesses. The ac-
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cused and his representative shall be permitted 
to hear the testimony of witnesses." 
It is readily ascertained that as a condition to dis-
charge the plaintiff is entitled to the following, unless 
he admit.s his guilt: 
( 1) The rule must be a pplic.able to the facts in-
volved. 
(2) He is entitled to hear the testimony of wit-
nesses. 
(3) He is entitled to interrogate witnesses. 
( 4) He is entitled to have a fair and impartial 
hearing and his guilt established. 
( 5) He is entitle·d to notice. 
(6) He is entitled to be represented by an em-
ployee of his choice. 
Of these six elements only the l·ast two were ac-
corded the plaintiff. Indeed the defendant coneedes by 
interrogatory admissions .and testimony that no evidence 
was introduced against him, no witnesses appeared, so 
that he was deprived of his opportunity to cross-examine. 
Indeed, by the admission of the defendant, it possessed, 
even under it's version of the facts, no testimony or 
evidence contradictory to that adduced at the hearing 
until over eight months had elapsed. 
Under the Federal rule, as well as the Utah rule, 
it must be conceded that the defendant did not comply 
with its require~d condition precedent and that th·e dis-
charge thus effected was in viol~ation of the contract 
and the law. 
It might be appropri·ate to exarnine the defendant's 
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claimed evidence based upon which it claim.s plaintiff 
was not ill. It is based upon two letters (Defendant's 
Exhibits 3 and 6) in which Dr. Stratford states that 
plaintiff was cap·able of working after his release on 
July 11, 1945. 
There is no argument about that. It will be recalled 
that plaintiff w,a,s scalded prior to July 11, and was 
being treated by Dr. Stratford. At the conclusion of 
his treatment he was relea.sed for work and did in fact 
work. Dr. Stratford's letter related to that accident 
and not to plaintiff's subsequent illness. 
Dr. Stratford did not state that he wasn't ill subse-
quent to that time. Defendant attempts to draw that 
inference, but in so doing it of necessity must make 
a liar out of Dr. Stratford and accuse its own witne.ss 
of unethieal conduct. Subsequent to July 11, the plain-
tiff saw Dr. Stratford who treated him for an infection 
of the inner ear and a sore throat, who later certified 
that he needed no more treatment, .and released him 
from his care to return to work. The release would be 
pointless and needless if plaintiff had never been under 
any disability to start with and would itself have consti-
tuted a fraud on the defendant. 
It is suggeste~d that plaintiff- was entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law. There was no jury issue to 
submit relative to whether the contract was complied 
with, as all of the evidence was to the effect that it was 
not. There was and is no dispute as to the relevant 
facts adduced at the hearing. It is so well e.stablished 
as to require no citations that where there are no issues 
of fact, it is for the court to decide. 
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POINT III 
DEFENDANT IS BOUND BY ITS TESTIMONY AND ORAL 
ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF' WAS DISCHARGE·D· AT LEAST 
IN PART FOR REASONS OTHER THAN RULE 55(b). 
!This was conceded by counsel in his opening state-
ment. In commenting on what he intended to prove, 
he quoted Mr. P~aulsen, the Vice President of the De-
fendant, as follows (Tr. 11): 
"Mr. Paulsen said in substance and effect, 
and these men will have to tell you exactly what 
it is, and this will be the evidence, it's the posi-
tion of the company that 1\{r. Russell did not 
tell the truth at that investigation, that he was 
not sick during that period as he contends that 
he was, but that he was op·erating the Pineview 
Inn at the head of Ogden Canyon." 
And again (Tr. 13): 
"Now, it's our position that during all this 
ten day period and prior thereto Mr. Rus.sell 
was not t~aking care of his job but was operating 
a beer tavern at Pineview Inn, quite an establish-
ment." 
The defendant in so stating actually bound itself 
to the fact that it was trying the plaintiff for acts other 
than that upon which the investigation was based. This 
position w.as born out in the testin1ony of Mr. Paulsen, 
supra (Tr. 174). 
The defendant 'vas and is bound as a matter of 
law by its uncontradicted testimony and the statement 
of its attorney. 
See: Le-high Valley R. Co. r. McGranalwn 6 F. (2) 
431; Security State Bank v. M oss1nan, 131 Kan. 505, 
292 P. 935; Sinunons v. Harris, (Okla.) 235 P. 508; 
Rorvick v. Astoria Box & Paper Go., Ore. 299 P. 333. 
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It is contended that that statement and testimony 
conclusively demonstrate, that the defendant's alleged 
position is a farce, beeaus-e it concedes that they were 
trying him for causes not within the scope of the rule. 
Under a contract such as this, a proper discha.rge 
may not be had without a hearing, nor may a discharge 
be supported upon grounds other than those stated in 
the specific charge. In Kiker v. Insurance Company, 
(N.M.) 23 P. (2) 366, the court s~aid: 
"Generally, in an .action for wrongful dis-
charge, the employer may plead in defense any 
sufficient cause, though it may have been un-
known to him at the time, though his real reason 
or motive may have been something else, and 
though another cause may have been expressly 
assigned. Williston on Contracts, Sec. 7 44, 839; 
Labatt on Master and Servant, S·ec. 187; Page 
on Contracts (2d Ed), Sec. 3058; 19 R.C.L. 516; 
39 C.J. 89. 
"But the parties of course have the right to 
stipulate the manner in which the employe-r may 
terminate the contract. If they stipulate that 
it shall be by written notice .specifying the e;ause, 
a discharge specifying no cause, or an insufficient 
cause, would be wrongful. It follows that, under 
such a contract, a cause not specified would not 
be available in defense. 620, 55 Am. St. Rep. 
375, cited; 18 R.C.L. 516, Mortimer v. Bristol, 190 
App. Div. 452, 180 N.Y.S. 55." 
In Cole v. Loew's Inc., 8 Fed. Rules Dec. 508, the 
court said: 
"Where the contract specified grounds for 
termination or suspension and written notice is 
provided for, the employer, in order to justify 
hi.s action, must show that the ground given in 
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the notice actually existed. He cannot justify his 
action on other grounds named in the contract, 
which, although true, were not stated in the 
notice." 
And in Levy v. Jarett, (Tex.) 198 S.W. 333, the 
court said: 
"If the acts of misconduct other than plan-
ning to enter business for himself now charged 
against the plaintiff would have justified his dis-
charge, they were not made the basis of the term-
ination of the contract and could not affect the 
plaintiff's right to recover on it, .as the defendant 
at that time did not treat .such acts as being a 
breach of contract * *" 
Thus we submit the action of the defendant was 
illegal and in breach of the contract and the law. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS AND ITS RE-
FUSAL TO GIVE THE PLAINTIFF\JS REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
The court refused to give any instructions that in 
any way encompassed the federal rule or even those 
phas-es of it that this court has recognized and adopted. 
On the contrary, the court ·w··ent far and beyond any 
established law in the giving of its instructions. It 'vent 
far beyond any request of the defendant 'vho advised 
the court of that fact. An exan1ination of the following 
part of the record is illu1ninating: 
"Mr. Olmstead: Con1es now the plaintiff, 
both sides having rested in tllis action, and in 
the absence of the jury, excepts to the instruc-
tions of the court to the jury as follows: 
"1. Excepts to that portion of instruction 
number two designated as sub paragraph t'vo 
22 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
thereof. Excepts to that portion of instruction 
number two under sub paragraph 3A thereof ap-
pearing in parenthesis and reading as follows: 
'In other words an employee cannot recover for 
being dismissed on a charge which is true, re-
gardless of whether or not he was accorded a 
proper investigation because the law presumes 
that had he been accorded a proper investigation 
he would have been dismissed anyway. Under 
such a circumstance, the sufficiency of the investi-
gation is immaterial.' 
"Mr. Bronson: In that connection, your 
Honor, I believe that is a little bit too favorable 
to me. I think maybe it would bei accurate if it 
read in substance something like this : In other 
words an employee cannot recover for being dis-
missed on a charge which is true regardless of 
whether or not he was accorded a proper investi-
gation beeause the law presumes had he been ac-
corded a proper investigation, and something to 
the effect right in there and the fact was made 
to appear that he had violated the rule or that 
he was guilty of the charge, he would have been 
dismissed anyhow. 
"The Court: I think that is covered well 
enough." 
The quoted instruction is diametrically opposite, not 
only to the rule of Transcontinental & Western .Air, Inc., 
v. K appal, supra, but it is also diametrically opposed 
to the rule of this court which states that compliance 
with the contractual provisions is a condition ptecedent 
to discharge. 
Where, it might be asked, is there a presumption 
that the hearing and compliance with the contract is 
immaterial if grounds for discharge did in fact exist~ 
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If such is the law, of what value is a contract~ It is 
submitted that the Instruction No. 2, and particularly 
the quoted portion thereof, is erroneous, contrary to 
law, and prejudicial to the rights of the plaintiff. 
The court's Instructions No. 3 and No. 5 are also 
incorrect statements of the law and prejudicial to the 
rights of the plaintiff. These errors are similar and 
these two instructions can more ea.sily be considered 
together. In Instruction No. 3 the court gratuitously 
raised an issue neither raised, pleaded or contended 
by the defendant as to an implied waiver of his con-
tractual rights. No evidence was directed to that issue. 
In addition, the second paragraph of such instruc-
tion states : 
Rule 38 above does not insure an employee 
that he will not be dismissed on a charge for 
which he is innocent because it may be possible 
that after an investigation in full compli•ance with 
Rule 38 a mistake might occur. In such an event 
the Railroad is not libel." 
Mistake is. not a defense to a breach of an employ-
ment ·contract. The rule is laid out in 56 C.J.S. (Master 
and Servant) Section 51: 
"It ha.s been held, however, that a master 
may defend an .action for 'v-rongful discharge by 
showing that the discharge 'Yas by mistake, and 
that as soon as the mistake 'vas discovered, and 
before the s-ervant had sustained any damages, he 
offered to revoke, and insisted in revoking, the 
discharge." 
The defendant did none of th-e things nece.ssary to 
set up or claim the defense of mistake, nor did it at 
any time revoke or offer to revoke a mistake, or even 
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claim any rnistake was made. The instruction in its 
incomplete form w~as not only inapplicable to the issues 
and incorrect, but it could only serve to mislead ,and 
confuse the jury. 
The court compounded this error by it's instruction 
No. 5 a.s follows: 
"You are instructed that the defendant had 
a right to dismiss any employee, including the 
plaintiff W. B. Russell, for violation of Rule 
55 (b) of the contract which is in evidence,, so 
long as the defendant was not acting in bad faith 
and arbitrarily, and so long as the employee was 
physically able to comply with the provisions of 
said rule 55 (b). And if you find that the plain-
tiff did violate said rule 55 (b) being physically 
able to comply therewith, and that the defend-
ant w~s not acting in bad faith and arbitrarily 
when it dismissed him for such violation, your 
verdict should be in favor of the· defendant and 
against the plaintiff 'no cause of action.' " 
It will be observed that before the plaintiff can 
win he must show two elements: 
(1) "bad faith on the part of the defendant." 
( 2) That it was physically impossible for the plain-
tiff to go down and get his form No. 153 prepared. 
This is another way of stating if in good faith 
the defendant made a mi.stake there is no liability. Is 
this the ordinary contract law that the defendant talks 
about~ Is this the standard treatment for the bre,ach of 
an ordinary garden variety contract~ 
It was impossible for the plaintiff to Win if the 
jury followed these instructions. It should be no sur-
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prise, therefore, that the jury found against the p·lain-
tiff. 
It was never claimed nor conceived that the law 
was such that if it was physically possible for a man 
to leave a hospital or sick bed, no matter how critical 
his condition might be, that his failure to do so would 
justify his discharge. Such a statement and conclusion 
is contrary to every case cited above. Nor was it ever 
claimed or. conceived that even if a person did so re-
move himself from a ho.spital or sick bed and was dis-
charged, that the defendant should go free if it made 
a mistake and acted in good faith. 
If, by the provisions of Instruction No. 5, the plain-
tiff to recover had to prove bad faith on the part of 
the defendant and in addition a physieal impossibility 
on his plart to perform, the defendant was entitled to 
a directed verdict because the plaintiff did not claim 
and he made no effort to prove that it was physically 
impossible for him in his illness to have gone to his 
place of employment or that the defendant acted in 
good or bad faith. The jury thus had no alternative 
but to find as it did. 
Similarly the jury could well find that the defend-
ant made a mistake, becaus-e the defendant did make a 
mistake in not according the plaintiff his contractual 
protection-or it eould find that it acted in good faith. 
If it found either, it 'vould have to conclude that the 
plaintiff had a fair hearing not,vithstanding the defend-
ant's admissions that illness, not physical impo.ssibility, 
w.as a defense, ;and not,Yithstanding the defendant's ad-
mitted flagrant breach of the contract requirements. 
By so instructing the jury, the trial court effec-
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tively prevented the plaintiff from a fair jury trial. 
Even had the jury been instructed properly, the plain-
tiff would not have had a chance to recover his proper 
legal damages because by Instruction No. 7 the court 
departed from the rule of damage.s laid down by the 
court in Russell v. O.U.R. & D., supra, and substituted 
one that permitted speculation and completely ignored 
the rule that the defendant must prove mitigation: 
"If you believe from the evidence that the 
plaintiff has sustained the burden of proof and 
is entitled to recover, you will then have the 
duty of assessing his damages, if any. 
"The damages plaintiff is entitled to recover, 
in the event you decide he i.s entitled to recover 
at all, is the amount you may believe from the 
evidence he would have earned on account of 
his continued employment by the defendant, less 
whatever amount you believe the evidence shows 
he has e~arned since he left the defendant's em-
ployment. 
"Therefore, you should first determine what 
you believe he would have earned had he con-
tinued in the employme.nt of the defendant, taking 
into consideration his rate of pay and the number 
of days you believe he would have worked, so 
far as shown by the evidence. In considering the 
amount he would have so earned, you should, so 
far as is shown by the ·evidence, consider whether 
he would have worked every day he was entitled 
to work during the period in question, or whether 
he would have been off work at times on account 
of holidays, vacations, leaves of absence, illness 
or other causes. 
"From such an amount as you thus determine 
plaintiff would have earned h~ad he continued 
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working for defendant, you must next deduct 
what the evidence shows he has ·earned during 
the period of time in question in other empJoy-
ment or business.'' 
Finally, it is submitted that the court erred in re-
fusing to give plaintiff's proposed instructions 1 to 12, 
which set out the rules of law as set forth in the federal 
decision,s hereinabove discussed, to the effect that the 
contractual condition precedent must be complied with, 
that the type of misconduct th~at would justify discharge 
must be defined, and the correct rules relative to the 
burden of proof must be set forth. 
The only instructions offered or given that purport 
in any way to comply with these federal rules, as set 
down in Transcontinental & Western Air Inc., v. Koppal, 
supra, were plaintiff's proposed instruction No. 1 which 
was refused by the court. As it is written it is entirely 
within the scope of the former decision in this action. 
It is a correct statement of the law and it is not covered 
by any of the court's instructions, and states : 
"You are instructed that the contract of em-
ployment, Article 8, Rule 38, provides as far as 
is here material, as follows: 
" 'Investigations: No yardman "ill be sus-
pended or dismissed without first having a fair 
and imparti~al hearing and his guilt established. 
The man whos-e case is under consideration may 
be represented by an employee of his choice, w·ho 
n1ay be a comn1itteeman, 'vho will be permitted 
to interrogate witnesses. The accused and his 
representative shall be permitted to hear the testi-
mony of witnesses.' 
"You are instructed that pl,aintiff 'Yas on 
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August 4, 1945 di.scharged for an alleged viola-
tion of Rule 55 (b) of the contract in that he had 
been absent from work for a period in excess 
of 10 days without leave. In order for such dis-
charge to have been lawful and just it is essential 
that plaintiff have been afforded the type of 
hearing described above. Accordingly, if you find 
from a preponderance of the evidence that he 
was not afforded a fair and impartial hearing, 
or that his guilt was not established, or that he 
was not permitted to hear the witnes.ses against 
him or was not provided the other rights therein 
set forth, his discharge was not lawful. 
"In considering this matter you are first to 
consider the transcript of the record of such pro-
ceedings which has been received in e-vidence. If 
you find therefrom that the same conclusively 
show:s that plaintiff was not afforded his rights 
under the contract, then you will find that plain-
tiff's discharge was wrongful. On the other hand, 
if you find that such transcript does not con-
clusively show that plaintiff was not afforded 
his rights under the contract, then in determin-
ing this matter you will consider such other evi-
dence touching upon the matters referred to as 
is before you." 
Plaintiff's propo.s·ed instructions Nos. 4, 5 and 7 
were prepared in accordance with the rule laid down 
in Ehlers v. Langley, Goudal v. DeMille Pictures Corp., 
and Bang v. International Sisal Co., supra. They present 
the only correct definition of the type of misconduct that 
will justify discharge. They set forth correctly the stand-
ard by which the acts of the plaintiff n1ust be measured 
and judged. Now here did the court atte1npt to advise the 
jury on these points other than in its erroneous instruC-
tion No. 5. 
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Plaintiff's proposed instructions No. 10 and No. 11 
set forth the defendant's duty relative to the burden 
of proof. The court in the previous case recognized that 
the burden of proving justification for the discharge 
rests upon the employer. As a part of this justification 
is the requirement that the defendant must prove that 
it was complied with the conditions precedent to dis-
charge, Russell v. O.U.R. & D., supra. These rules are 
universally recognized, not only by the federal courts 
but by the courts of the various states. 
See: New Orleans Belt Ry. v. Ward, supra; Cole 
v. Loew's, Inc., supra, cert. denied 95 L. Ed. 686; Sawyer 
v. Drew & Co., supra, affirmed 209 F. (2) 566; Hansen 
v. Columbia Brewing Co. (Wash.) 122 P. (2) 489; 
Lambert v. Laing & Thompson I ron W arks (Ore.) 264 
P. 362; Lone Star Cotton "jfills v. Thomas (Tex.) 227 
S.W. (2) 300; Schaffer v. Park City Bowl (ill.) 102 
N.E. (2) 665; Johnson v. Thonzpson (Mo.) 236 S.W. 
(2) 1. 
The trial court refused to so instruct the jury as 
to the burden of proof. Indeed a reading of the court's 
instruction No. 5 shows it to be erroneous on the further 
ground that it implies that the burden of proof to show 
justification is on the plaintiff rather than the defend-
ant. This misconception "\Yas prevalent throughout the 
trial. The couns:el for the plaintiff vigorously contended 
(Tr. 57-59) that the defendant must first prove its com-
pliance with these conditions precedent before attenlpt-
ing to justify plaintiff's discharge under any theory. All 
objections of p~laintiff "\vere overruled and the record 
is devoid of any proof that the defendant did in fact 
comply with its contractual prerequisites to discharge. 
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In .so ruling on the evidence, and in so failing to 
instruct on the burden of pro_of, the court prejudicially 
and adversely affected the rights of the p1aintiff. 
CONCLUSION 
It is submitted that plaintiff should have been en-
titled to judgment as a matter of law by reason of the 
points hereinbefore set forth. However, it is submitted 
that there is an even more cogent reason for the re-
versal of this judgment and the reinstatement of the 
initial judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against 
the defendant. The Supreme c·ourt has heretofore held 
that the plaintiff made out a prima facie c~se for judg-
ment, but on the strength of the representations of the 
counsel for the defendant that it all times had proof 
that the plaintiff was not in fact ill and was in fact 
working at the beer tavern all during the ten days' ab-
sence, which was the subject of the law suit, this court 
determined that justice compelled affording the defend-
ant the opportunity of making that proof. The defend-
ant was afforded the opportunity of producing any and 
all witnesses to show that the plaintiff was in fact 
working each and every day at the Pine View Inn and 
of producing evidence to show that the plaintiff was 
not in fact ill. The record reflects the wide discrepancy 
between the claims and the proof. The record is devoid 
of any evidence that plaintiff was in fact working during 
the ten day period. The record is likewise devoid of 
any evidence to the effect that he was not in fact ill. 
The medicines and testimony and conduct of the doctor 
in releasing him to return to work all militate against 
the defendant's proposition. 
We reiterate that the fundamental basis for the re-
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versal by this court of the judgment in plaintiff's favor 
in the first trial was defendant's representations to 
this court that it could, and would if given the opportun-
ity, prove the complete falsity of plaintiff's claimed ill-
ness; and that it could and would prove that he had lied 
at his hearing concerning his illness, and that in truth 
and in fact he was not ill but he was working elsewhere 
during the period of his absence from the railroad. 
Based thereon this court reversed on the previous ap-
peal, and sent the case back to the lower court with di-
rections that defendant's evidence on these matters be 
received and considered. The case has now been re-
tried, and the record on retrial is as devoid of any proof 
of these asserted facts as was tlre original trial record-
indeed, as devoid of proof of these facts as was the 
record of the hearing that led to plaintiff's discharge. 
It is submitted, therefore, in conclusion, that the 
defendant was afforded an opportunity to which he 
was not entitled under the federal rule, but that even 
this wide latitude was insufficient to permit the defend-
ant to produce any evidence to justify plaintiff's dis-
charge. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NEIL R. OLMSTEAD, 
C. C. PATTERSON, 
Attorneys fo1· Appellant 
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